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In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests,
but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of
government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneﬁcial public expenditures for reelecting
incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians also liable for decisions made
by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with
respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.
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1 Introduction
As noted by Seabright (1996), political constitutions are incomplete contracts that leave room for abuse of
power. In democracies, voters can discipline politicians by threatening to vote them out of oﬃce if they
abuse their power and reward good politicians by reelecting them. The general purpose of this paper is
to address voters’ ability to discipline politicians when there are two levels of government and when the
incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the incumbent at the other.
In countries with multi-tiered governments, decisions made by one level of government often aﬀect gov-
ernments at other levels. Tax bases commonly overlap and responsibilities can intersect or be closely related.
Examples of the latter are shared responsibilities for redistribution, infrastructure, and environmental pro-
tection between, for example, federal and state governments in the United States. In such situations, voters
may be unable to accurately distinguish the consequences of the decisions made by one level of government
from the consequences of decisions made by the other. In addition, when governments are aﬀected by each
others’ decisions, it is often reasonable to assume that one level of government acts as a Stackelberg leader
relative to the other. The relative size of the governments is one reason why a higher level of government
is commonly assumed to act as a Stackelberg leader relative to lower-level governments (Keen and Kotso-
giannis 2003). It is also possible that a lower-level government might become a Stackelberg leader relative a
higher-level government, when the higher-level government is relatively weak (e.g., because the lower-level
government already had commitments to certain policies when the higher level was formed). One example
is that of the individual member states of the European Union, which often are considered to be Stackelberg
leaders relative to the federal level (e.g., Caplan and Silva 1999; Aronsson, Jonsson, and Sjögren 2006). One
level of government might also become a Stackelberg leader because of constitutional requirements that it
decide on its budget before the other level of government does. Another example is that a government
might get a Stackelberg role if it has to sign legal binding contracts on procurements and thereby commit to
certain expenditures. In this paper, the higher-level government is treated as a Stackelberg leader relative
to the lower-level government, but, as discussed below, the results apply equally well to situations where
the roles are reversed.
In the model presented in this paper, the two levels of government each provide one good and ﬁnance
their expenditures with taxes. The goods are inputs in a production function and voters observe the output,
but are generally assumed not to observe the input levels. The latter assumption is made to mimic situations
where voters are unable to accurately distinguish between the eﬀorts of diﬀerent governments.
The governments are assumed to be controlled by politicians motivated solely by self-interest who choose
their policies to maximize the discounted value of their rents. This Leviathan view of politicians may not
perfectly depict reality, but as long as politicians — like other humans — are partly driven by self-interest,
this assumption allows us to study some interesting aspects of voters’ electoral control. To focus on moral
hazard, I neglect adverse selection issues by assuming that all politicians are identical.
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politicians in power can choose policies with discretion.1 To make selﬁsh politicians restrain from Leviathan
policies, voters allow them rents while in oﬃce and promise them reelection if they behave. These rents,
which can be resources politicians divert to their private consumption, more broadly capture conﬂict of
interests between voters and their representatives; for example, voters may favor a diﬀerent composition of
government spending than politicians.
One might ask whether politicians trying to divert rent is an important problem in reality, especially in
stable democracies. Even if we observe cases where politicians clearly attempt to enrich themselves at the
cost of the public — one example being the recent expense scandal in the British Parliament — the magnitudes
of rents may not appear to be a major problem in democracies. One possible explanation for this is that
repeated elections have a disciplining eﬀect, in line with the analysis in this and related papers.
This paper relates to Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) and even closer to Wrede (2002), who ana-
lyzed the behavior of selﬁsh politicians in countries with two government bodies and compared the outcomes
to those of unitary countries. While Persson et al. (1997) looked at the separation of powers between the
executive and legislative branches of government and focused on the role of checks and balances in, for
example, budget processes, Wrede, as I do, studied the separation of powers between levels of government
and focused on the eﬀects of diﬀerent voting strategies, but assumed that the incumbents act as Nash
competitors towards each other. Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) found that when two government
bodies can commit resources without requiring approval from each other, the total political rent is higher
than with only one government body. Another of Wrede’s main ﬁndings is that voters can strengthen their
power by introducing reciprocal liability, which reduces the independence of the governments, but that
there is a risk of reciprocal liability leading to permanent Leviathan policy. Reciprocal liability is created
by letting the incumbents’ reelection probabilities also depend on the decisions of their counterparts at the
other level of government.
The results of this paper indicate that the total tax rate is higher with two government bodies than
with one. This is because the total political rent is higher with two government bodies — as demonstrated
previously by Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) — and because voters will want to reduce public
consumption by less than one unit when total rent is increased by one unit. The results also demonstrate
that, with two government bodies, voters can reduce the resources diverted to political rents by increasing
the beneﬁcial public expenditures they require for reelecting incumbents. This means that, for a given
level of the total political rent, voters will choose higher public expenditures and thus higher taxes, which
increases the diﬀerence between the total tax rate in two- and one-government countries.
Other novel results depend on the assumption of Stackelberg leadership: among other matters, these re-
sults describe diﬀerences in voters’ marginal cost of expenditures by the Stackelberg leader and expenditures
by the follower, and how voters are aﬀected if the Stackelberg leader is able to give an intergovernmental
1One reason as to why constitutions are incomplete contract is that some information needed for eﬃcient contracts are
lacking or not veriﬁable, implying that politicians cannot be held legally responsible for some of their actions (Seabright 1996).
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) demonstrated that information asymmetries concerning the state of nature can also be
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transfer to the follower. In addition, unlike the situation described by Wrede (2002), the results show that,
with Stackelberg leadership, there is no risk of reciprocal liability leading to permanent Leviathan policy.
Three retrospective voting strategies are considered in the present paper. Barro (1973) and Fere-
john (1986) demonstrated theoretically that voters can prevent governments from myopically behaving
as Leviathans by using retrospective voting strategies. Many scholars have also found empirical support for
voters employing retrospective voting strategies and for this aﬀecting incumbents’ decisions (e.g., Besley
and Case 1995; Lewis-Beck 1998).
Like Wrede, I consider one voting strategy with full reciprocal liability, meaning that voters reelect
either the incumbents at both levels or none of the incumbents, and contrast this solution to that obtained
when voters evaluate the performance of both incumbents entirely separately. Besides these two extreme
strategies, I also consider a voting strategy with partial reciprocal liability. Here, voters are assumed to hold
incumbents at both levels jointly responsible for the output produced, but not to hold the incumbent at each
level responsible for the tax determined and collected by the incumbent at the other level. When voters have
too little information to evaluate politicians separately, for example, because the division of responsibilities
between levels of government is unclear to the voters, some degree of reciprocal liability is unavoidable. For
example, in Sweden, where local governments provide basic care to the elderly while regional governments
are responsible for providing more advanced medical care, voters apparently sometimes do not know which
politicians to blame when healthcare to the elderly is deemed inadequate, and some voters therefore employ
voting strategies with partial reciprocal liability.
In the next section, I set up the model and analyze the benchmark policy decisions of voters and
the incumbent in a unitary country. Section 3 presents the solutions achieved using the diﬀerent voting
strategies in a two-tiered-government country. First, the voting strategy with no reciprocal liability is
analyzed (subsection 3.1), then that with partial reciprocal liability (subsection 3.2), and ﬁnally that with
full reciprocal liability (subsection 3.3). In section 4, I discuss how voters are aﬀected if the Stackelberg
leader is able to give an intergovernmental transfer to the incumbent at the other level. Finally, section 5
presents the paper’s conclusions.
2 The model and the unitary state benchmark
An inﬁnite series of independent periods is considered. Since the conditions in all periods are the same, no
time index is used. The federation consists of two levels of government, called the federal and state levels.
Following Wrede (2002), horizontal divisions of the country are neglected to focus on the common-pool
problem, which arises when a government body can independently commit public expenditures without
requiring approval from other government bodies.
The instantaneous utility function of the voters is written U = u(c)+ϕ(q), where c is private consumption
and q is the output produced by the publicly provided inputs. Preferences are identical and both sub-utility
functions are increasing in their arguments and strictly concave. Assuming identical preferences allows usElectoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 4
to neglect that elections also serve to aggregate preferences, albeit always imperfectly.
The production function, q = q(y,Y ), indicates that the output is a function of the input provided by
the state government, y, and of the input provided by the federal government, Y . The function is increasing








∂Y and vice versa. For example, the inputs can be basic and medical
care, which produce health, or environmental legislation and environmental monitoring, which together
aﬀect environmental quality.
Input y is assumed to be provided exclusively by the state government and Y is assumed to be exclusively
provided by the federal government. These assumptions are made to focus on a situation when voters have
diﬃculties separating the actions of two levels of government. For simplicity, the units are chosen so that
the unit costs of y and Y are both 1.
Each level of government is assumed to ﬁnance its expenditures using a tax and to balance its budget
in each period. For simplicity, I follow Persson et al. (1997) by assuming that the tax base is exogenously
given and normalize it to one.2 Individuals have no access to capital markets, so they consume all their
income. The individuals’ budget constraint can thus be written 1 − t − T = c, where t and T are the tax
rates imposed by the state and federal governments, respectively.
The politicians are assumed to be inﬁnitely lived and to choose their policies to maximize the discounted
value of their rents. Ferejohn (1986) provides one rationale for assuming inﬁnitely lived politicians, namely,
that competitors for oﬃce can be thought of as political parties that last indeﬁnitely and manage to solve
their internal incentive problems.
Voters are assumed to employ simple retrospective voting strategies based on cutoﬀ levels for the tax
rates and the output (or on y and Y ) and are assumed never to reelect politicians who are voted out of
oﬃce.3 Following Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002), I restrict the analysis to strategies based on the
outcomes in the current period and not in any previous period. The advantage of such strategies is that
they are simple enough to be plausible; as noted by Persson et al. (1997), such voting strategies can be seen
as a simple convention adopted by voters and suggested by social norms. In addition, in this model, where
there is no uncertainty regarding the state of the economy and where all politicians are identical, voters
would not beneﬁt from basing their strategies on outcomes in previous periods.
2.1 The solution in a unitary country
In a unitary country, both public goods are provided by a central government, that ﬁnances its expenditures
using a single rate, τ. At the start of each period, p, the voters determine cutoﬀ levels τ0 and q0 and announce
that they will reelect the incumbent if and only if τ ≤ τ0 and q ≥ q0; since c = (1 − τ), this is equivalent
to determining cutoﬀ levels for c and q. Next, the incumbent government makes its expenditure and tax
2The tax can resemble a head tax, or — if labor supply is inelastic — an income tax.
3Wrede (2001) demonstrated that voters’ ability to control politicians is greater if politicians who are ousted from oﬃce
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decisions, knowing the voting rule. At the end of the period, the voters observe τ and q and determine
whether to reelect the incumbent government according to the announced voting rule. Following Persson
et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002), I assume that voters are able to commit to voting rules. This is not a
strong assumption: since all politicians are identical, voters are indiﬀerent as to whether to reelect the
incumbent government or elect an opposition, meaning that there is no cost to the voters associated with
ousting politicians who do not meet the required cutoﬀ levels.
The selﬁsh incumbent’s objective is to maximize the discounted value of all rents he will obtain. An
incumbent who seeks reelection will choose y and Y to maximize his rents, χ, subject to τ ≤ τ0, q ≥ q0,
and the budget constraint τ − y − Y = χ. The incumbent will never set τ below τ0 and never spend more




χ = τ0 − y − Y
subject to
q(y,Y ) = q0.
Letting λ denote the Lagrangian multiplier, the ﬁrst-order conditions are written








This tells us that the incumbent will choose an input combination where the marginal products of y and Y
are equal, meaning that the output will be produced eﬃciently.
An incumbent who chooses to maximize immediate payoﬀs instead of fulﬁlling the reelection criteria
would set τ = 1, y = Y = 0 and obtain a payoﬀ of 1. Since the incumbent would never be reelected by
pursuing this tactic, it also follows that the discounted value of all payoﬀs to the incumbent would amount to
1. I assume that incumbents deviate from the proposed policy only if the present value of their rents thereby
becomes strictly higher. To ensure that an incumbent adheres to the proposed policy, voters therefore set τ0
and q0 so that the present value of the rents that an incumbent staying in oﬃce is guaranteed also amounts
to 1. Since all periods are identical, this means that an incumbent in each period must be given a rent of
χ0 = 1 − δ, where δ, 0 < δ < 1, is the discount factor.4
The voters will choose cutoﬀ levels of τ0 and q0 so that the marginal utility of private consumption
equals the marginal utilities of each publicly provided good, i.e., so that u￿ = ϕ￿ ∂q
∂y = ϕ￿ ∂q
∂Y . Also the
solution obtained when benevolent politicians in a unitary state choose τ, y, and Y is characterized by
u￿ = ϕ￿ ∂q
∂y = ϕ￿ ∂q
∂Y , but since no resources are diverted to rents, the marginal utilities are lower in that
4Note that the rent would be higher if the government could borrow, but lower if it were unable to collect all resources in
the economy as taxes. The results of this paper would remain unchanged if the government could collect only a given fraction
of the resources or if it could run up deﬁcits, unless it could borrow so much that all resources in the economy were diverted
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situation.5 In other words, both private consumption and input levels are lower when politicians divert
rents, while the tax rate is higher.
3 Solutions in the case of a two-tier government
The federal incumbent is assumed to make its decisions before — and is treated as a Stackelberg leader
relative to — the state incumbent. Since horizontal divisions of the country are neglected, this is the only
principal diﬀerence between the two levels of government, meaning that the model can also be used to
understand situations where the state incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader. To highlight the principal
diﬀerence between the situations for the two incumbents, in the following I call the state incumbent the
“follower” and the federal incumbent the “leader”.
Following Wrede (2002), I assume that incumbents at both levels do not cooperate, that they maximize
the discounted value of their rents, and that they have the same discount factor as the incumbent in the
unitary nation. When voters determine separate cutoﬀ levels for the two tax rates, both are assumed to
be strictly below 1/2. Still, if the incumbents deviate from the proposed policies, we cannot rule out that
the sum of the tax rates exceeds 1. Since the sum of the governments’ tax revenues cannot exceed the tax
base, which equals 1, I follow Persson et al. (1997) by assuming that if the total tax rate exceeds 1, the
governments obtain tax revenues equal to 1/2 each. That is, the maximum tax revenues to the state and
federal governments are r = max{1 − T,1/2} and R = max{1 − t,1/2}, respectively.
3.1 Voting strategy 1, observable inputs and no reciprocal liability
When one incumbent is responsible for providing y while another is responsible for providing Y , it may
matter whether the levels of y and Y are observable to the voters. To study this, the solution that would
occur if voters observed y and Y and used this information to evaluate the incumbents separately is described
in this subsection. In the following two subsections, solutions obtained when y and Y are unobservable to
the voters are compared with this solution.
Under strategy 1, voters at the start of each period determine cutoﬀ levels t1, T1, y1 and Y1 and announce
that they will reelect the follower if and only if t ≤ t1 and y ≥ y1 and the leader if and only if T ≤ T1
and Y ≥ Y 1. Next, the leader makes his expenditure and tax decisions, taking into account the possible
reactions of the follower. Thereafter, the follower makes his expenditure and tax decisions, and at the end
of the period the voters observe t, T, y, and Y and determine whether to reelect the politicians according
to the announced voting rules.
The follower will either deviate from the proposed policy by choosing t = r and y = 0 or seek reelection
by choosing t = t1 and y = y1.6 If the follower would deviate, his payoﬀ would equal r = max{1 −T,1/2}.
5See Appendix A for the derivation of these results.
6To be exact, if the follower deviates when T ≥ 1/2, it does not matter what tax rate the follower chooses as long as it is
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Therefore, the follower will seek reelection if and only if the discounted value of the rents he is allowed per
period in oﬃce, x1, is at least at large as r; that is, if
x1 ≡ t1 − y1 ≥ r(1 − δ). (1)
Condition (1) indicates that the follower will be more likely to seek reelection the lower is y1, the higher is
t1 and — for values of T below 1/2 — the higher is T.
The situation of the leader is essentially the same as that of the follower. The leader can deviate from
the proposed policy by choosing T = R and Y = 0 and would then obtain a payoﬀ of R = max{1−t,1/2}.
Therefore, the leader will seek reelection if and only if the discounted value of the rents he is allowed per
period in oﬃce, X1, is at least at large as R, that is, if
X1 ≡ T1 − Y1 ≥ R(1 − δ). (2)
Condition (2) indicates that the leader will be more likely to seek reelection the lower is Y1, the higher is
T1 and — for values of t below 1/2 — the higher is t.
In the equilibrium, the voters will determine the rents so that none of the incumbents prefers to deviate,
which means that y = y1, Y = Y1, t = t1 = y1 + x1, and T = T1 = Y1 + X1. The rents can therefore be
written as
x1 = (1 − Y1 − X1)(1 − δ), (3)
X1 = (1 − y1 − x1)(1 − δ). (4)
Solving for x1 and X1 gives
x1 =










[2 − y1 − Y1]
2 − δ
(1 − δ). (7)
Under this strategy, the follower will not react to the leader’s decisions. For Y = Y1 and T = T1, the
follower will obtain the same discounted rents by fulﬁlling the reelection criteria as by deviating from them,
and will then, by assumption, fulﬁll the reelection criteria. If the leader, for some unfathomable reason,
would deviate, the payoﬀ the follower could obtain by deviating would be reduced, meaning that he would
strongly prefer to seek reelection. That the follower does not react to the leader’s decisions under this
strategy means that the game eﬀectively becomes a Nash game, even though the leader makes decisions
ﬁrst, and the equilibrium can be described as a stable and unique Nash equilibrium.
Equations (3) and (4) tell us that the total political rent is larger under strategy 1 than in the unitary
country. Since t1 = y1 + x1 < 1/2 and T1 = Y1 + X1 < 1/2, by assumption, equations (3) and (4) indicateElectoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 8
that both x1 and X1 are strictly greater than χ0/2, which means that XTot
1 ≡ x1 + X1 > χ0 = (1 − δ).7
Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) derived corresponding results. While the model here diﬀers quite
signiﬁcantly from theirs, a feature common to all three models is that the government bodies can commit
resources without requiring approval from each other.8 This is known as a common-pool problem. That
the total political rent is larger in such settings is because the incumbents are able to deviate independently
and could therefore secure an immediate payoﬀ larger than half the tax base. To avoid a Leviathan policy,
voters have to guarantee political rents based on these “fallback payoﬀs”, meaning that the total rent in
the two-tier-government country must be allowed to be larger than in the unitary country.9 That the total
political rent is larger under strategy 1 means that voters are more strongly restricted than voters in the
unitary country, since the total political rent is larger under strategy 1. This makes the voters worse oﬀ;
that is, their utility is reduced.
Proposition 1 contains results describing the voters’ incentives regarding their public expenditure choices,
and the consequences of these for the total tax rate. Before turning to the proposition, let us deﬁne voters’
marginal cost of public expenditures as the reduction in private consumption that voters have to accept in
order to increase public expenditures by one unit.
Proposition 1 Under strategy 1, (a) voters’ marginal cost of public expenditures is below unity, and (b)
the output is produced eﬃciently.
To prove Proposition 1, let us analyze the voters’ choice of cutoﬀ levels. Using that 1−y1−Y1−XTot
1 = c,
the voters’ optimization problem can be written
Max
Y1,y1
V = u(1 − y1 − Y1 − XTot
1 ) + ϕ(q(y1,Y1)),
where XTot



















The expressions in square brackets describe how much voters will have to reduce their private consumption
to increase beneﬁcial public expenditures by one unit. In other words, 1 − 1−δ
2−δ is the voters’ marginal cost
of public expenditures and, since δ < 1, it is below unity, which proves (a). This result is explained by the
fact that the incumbents’ payoﬀs from deviating unilaterally, and thus their rents, depend on each others’
tax rate. When beneﬁcial public expenditures are increased, the tax rates must be increased as well. This
reduces the payoﬀs of deviating unilaterally, so the rents can also be reduced. That voters’ marginal cost of
7An alternative proof is that equation (7) indicates that XTot
1 > χ0, if and only if y1 + Y1 < δ. Note that t1 + T1 < 1
implies that y1 + Y1 < δ, since t1 + T1 = XTot
1 + y1 + Y1 = 1 +
y1+Y1−δ
2−δ can only be below one if y1 + Y1 < δ.
8Persson et al. (1997) also demonstrated that separation of powers between government bodies can be beneﬁcial to voters
if both bodies are required to agree on public policy.
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public expenditures is below unity in this case, while it was unity in the unitary country, works for higher
public expenditures here than in the unitary country.10
Result (b) is proved by combining the voters’ ﬁrst-order conditions (8) and (9) to get 1 =
∂q/∂y1
∂q/∂Y1, which
demonstrates that the voters choose an eﬃcient input combination with y1 = Y1. Result (b) is a consequence
of the total rent being reduced equally if voters increases y1 or Y1, implying that the marginal cost of both
inputs to the voters are the same. Equations (5) and (6) indicate that when y1 = Y1, x1 = X1, which in
turns means that t1 = T1; that is, the equilibrium under strategy 1 is symmetric.
3.2 Voting strategy 2, partial reciprocal liability
Here, I return to the assumption that y and Y are unobservable to the voters and therefore let the voters
determine one cutoﬀ level for q, instead of separate cutoﬀ levels for Y and y. Thus, under strategy 2, the
voters will reelect the follower if and only if t ≤ t2 and q ≥ q2, and the leader if and only if T ≤ T2 and
q ≥ q2. The rents under this strategy are denoted x2 and X2.
The follower will either deviate from the proposed policy by choosing t = r and y = 0 or seek reelection
by choosing t = t2 and y = yi
2, where yi
2 denotes the minimum value of y required to achieve q2 for Y = Y i
2.
If the follower would deviate, his payoﬀ would be r = max{1 − T,1/2}. Therefore, the follower will seek
reelection if and only if the discounted value of the rents he is allowed is at least at large as r, that is, if
x2 ≡ t2 − yi
2(q2,Y i
2) ≥ r(1 − δ). (10)
Condition (10) indicates that the follower will be more likely to seek reelection the lower is q2, the higher
are Y i
2 and t2 and — for values of T below 1/2 — the higher is T.
Thus, for the follower, the decision context itself is unaﬀected by the changed strategy. He still observes
the leader’s decisions before making his own and will still require a rent of r(1 − δ) to seek reelection. The
value of this required rent, however, is aﬀected by a changed decision context for the leader; unlike x1, x2
is directly aﬀected by the leader’s decisions, since yi
2 is a function of Y i
2.








subject to the budget constraint
T2 − Y2 = X2,
the voting rule (T2,q2), and the follower’s reactions.
If the leader seeks reelection, he prefers that the follower also seek reelection, since the value of Y
required to achieve q2 is decreasing in y. The leader would therefore set T = T2 and Y = Y I
2 , where Y I
2 is
10We cannot generally conclude whether the voters’ marginal cost for public expenditures would be below or above unity if
the tax base were endogenous, since we then would have a counteracting eﬀect. We can, however, conclude that, also with an
endogenous tax base, voters’ marginal cost for public expenditures would be lower with two levels of government than with
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the minimum value of Y for which the follower also seeks reelection: so that t2−yI
2(q2,Y I
2 ) = (1−T)(1−δ).11
Note that Y I
2 (q2,t2,T) is increasing in q2, but decreasing in t2 and T since the follower is prepared to increase
y when tax rates are increased. This is because a higher t2 increases the follower’s rent for a given yI
2, and
because a higher T reduces the follower’s payoﬀ from deviating.
If the leader does not seek reelection, for reasonable values of δ and q2 he would still prefer that the
follower seeks reelection: if both deviate from the voting rule, both obtain a payoﬀ equal to 1/2, but if
only the leader deviates, he could obtain a payoﬀ exceeding 1/2. To induce the follower to seek reelection,
the leader will set Y such that the maximum amount the follower is prepared to spend on his input is just
enough to achieve q2. Let us call these values of Y and y for Y II
2 and yII
2 . The rent the follower requires
not to deviate is only (1 − δ)/2 when the leader deviates (since T > 1/2 for payoﬀs to the leader of above
1/2), meaning that yII
2 = t2 − (1 − δ)/2. Thus, if the leader chooses Y = Y II
2 and T = 1 − t2, his payoﬀ
becomes 1 − Y II
2 − yII
2 − (1 − δ)/2. This is above 1/2 given that Y II
2 + yII
2 < δ/2, which is assumed. As
discussed in section 4, the leader’s choice would be altered if he could secure a payoﬀ exceeding 1/2 if both
incumbents deviate simultaneously.
For the same reason as for Y I
2 (q2,t2,T), Y II
2 (q2,t2) is increasing in q2 but decreasing in t2. It is, however,
unaﬀected by marginal changes in T, since T > 1/2 when the leader deviates. Since the payoﬀ that the
follower could obtain by deviating is smaller when the leader also deviates, we know that Y II




2 . As I demonstrate in Appendix B, a suﬃcient condition for Y II
2 > 0 is that less than 2/3 of the
follower’s tax revenues go to rents when he seeks reelection, which is assumed.
This means that the leader will seek reelection if and only if
X2 ≡ T2 − Y I
2 (q2,t2,T2) ≥
￿
1 − Y II
2 (q2,t2) − yII
2 (t2) − (1 − δ)/2
￿
(1 − δ). (11)
Rational voters will set t2, T2, and q2 so that both incumbents seek reelection. Using that r in (10) then
equals 1 − Y I
2 − X2 and substituting for X2, the rents can be written
x2 =
￿
1 − Y I
2 (q2,t2,T2) −
￿
1 − Y II
2 (q2,t2) − yII




(1 − δ), (12)
X2 =
￿
1 − Y II
2 (q2,t2) − yII
2 (t2) − (1 − δ)/2
￿
(1 − δ) (13)
and
XTot
2 = x2 + X2 =





1 − Y II
2 (q2,t2) − yII
2 (t2) − (1 − δ)/2
￿

(1 − δ). (14)
Note the asymmetry between (12) and (13): the leader’s rent is aﬀected by the total expenditures required
to achieve q2 if he deviates, while the follower’s rent is aﬀected, besides the rent to the leader, by only Y I
2 .
Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium under strategy 2 and compares it with the equilibrium under
strategy 1.
Proposition 2 Under strategy 2, (a) voters’ marginal cost of public expenditures is below unity, (b) the
output is produced ineﬃciently, and (c) voters are better oﬀ than under strategy 1.
11Since T2 < 1/2, r = 1 − T when the leader seeks reappointment.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 11
Appendix C gives the proofs to (a) and (b). The intuition for (a) is the same as under strategy 1: when
voters increase the beneﬁcial public expenditures by increasing the cutoﬀ levels, the payoﬀ from deviating











2 , respectively) are below unity.
By studying (14) we directly see the main reason for (b): Y I
2 , but not yI
2, has a direct negative eﬀect
on the total political rent, indicating that the voters’ marginal cost of Y becomes lower than that for y. A








2 ). Then, if the voters reduce yI
2/Y I
2 for a
given q2 — which they can do by reducing t2/T2 — a deviating leader will not have to increase Y II
2 as much as
yII
2 is reduced. This increases the leader’s rent and generates higher total political rent. As demonstrated in
Appendix C, this latter eﬀect is dominated by the former in the optimal solution, meaning that the voters’








and the output will be produced ineﬃciently with yI
2 < Y I
2 .
Voters have enough instruments to choose eﬃcient input mixes: they can, for example, reduce Y and
increase y by reducing T and increasing t. Despite this, voters will choose an ineﬃcient input combination
to reduce the total political rent. This result stems from two characteristics of the model: (i) that one
incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the other and (ii) that the Stackelberg leader’s decisions
will aﬀect whether the follower is reelected.
To prove (c), it is helpful to use that yII
2 +(1−δ)/2 = yI
2 +x2 = t2, which allows the rents to be written
as
x2 =
[1 − Y I
2 − (1 − Y II
2 − yI




[1 − Y II
2 − yI
2 − (1 − Y I





2 = x2 + X2 =
2 − yI
2 − Y I
2 − Y II
2
2 − δ
(1 − δ). (17)
Comparing (17) with (7), we see that for given levels of y and Y the total political rent under strategy 2 is
less than under strategy 1, since Y II
2 > 0. This means that voters are less restricted under strategy 2 and
thus obtain a higher utility.
That voters are worse oﬀ under strategy 1 than under strategy 2 might seem surprising, since they had
more information under strategy 1. The explanation, of course, is not the diﬀerence in information itself, but
that voters were assumed to use their additional information under strategy 1 to evaluate the incumbents
separately. As Wrede (2002) demonstrated, it may be in the voters’ interests to enforce reciprocal liability,
which is created when the reelection probabilities of both incumbents also depend on each others’ policies.
Basing the reelection decision on q, instead of on y and Y , in fact induces reciprocal liability, even though
stronger forms of reciprocal liability are possible. The reason why voters are better oﬀ if they enforce
reciprocal liability is that this reduces the leader’s possibility to deviate unilaterally and thus the payoﬀ he
would obtain by deviating. This, in turn, means that the rent that voters must guarantee the leader can beElectoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 12
reduced. For given levels of y and Y , the follower’s rent must be increased by (1 − δ) times the reduction
in the leader’s rent, meaning that the total political rent is reduced by δ times the reduction in the leader’s
rent. Thus, voters beneﬁt from enforcing reciprocal liability.
Suﬃcient conditions for voters to choose cutoﬀ values so that the total political rent is indeed lower here
than under strategy 1 are that voters’ marginal costs of y and Y are lower (or equally high) under strategy
2 than under strategy 1. Appendix D proves that the condition for Y holds. This is because an increase
in Y I
2 not only reduces x2, but also reduces X2, since a higher Y I
2 means higher q2 for a given yI
2 and thus
a higher Y II
2 (see equations 12 and 13). Appendix D demonstrates that the voters’ marginal cost of y will
be lower under strategy 2 than under strategy 1, if the production function is not too ﬂat with respect to












Voters will both spend more on private consumption and require higher public expenditures if the total
required rent is reduced, all else being equal. Thus, if XTot
2 ≤ XTot
1 and if voters’ marginal cost also of y is
indeed lower under strategy 2, voters will choose higher public expenditures than under strategy 1. Since
Y II











1 + Y I
1
￿
. Therefore, if voters’
marginal cost of y is also lower (or equally high) under strategy 2 than under strategy 1, voters will require
higher public expenditures under strategy 2 and the total political rent will be lower than under strategy 1.
One might ask whether the leader beneﬁts from being a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other
incumbent. Often, being a Stackelberg leader is advantageous, but in some situations it is a disadvantage
to be forced to show one’s cards before the other player determines his strategy. Let us start by considering
whether the leader is better oﬀ than the follower. Comparing equations (15) and (16), we see that yI
2 < Y I
2
works for x2 < X2, but that Y II
2 has a counteracting eﬀect. Equations (15) and (16) give
X2 − x2 =
￿
Y I














, which may or may not be
true. Thus, the leader does not necessarily obtain a higher rent than the follower does. This also means
that the leader can actually obtain a lower rent than he would if the two incumbents instead acted as
Nash competitors towards each other. Then, both incumbents would obtain rents equal to the rents under
strategy 1. If, as seems likely, the total rent is lower under strategy 2 than under strategy 1, a necessary
condition for X2 not to fall below X1 is that the leader obtain a higher share of the total rent under strategy
2, but as just demonstrated, this is not necessarily the case. That the leader’s rent can fall below the one
he would obtain in the Nash equilibrium is, of course, not explained by his ability to inﬂuence the follower,
but by that he is assumed to make its decision before the follower. This means that the leader can not
choose to simultaneously with the follower decide whether to deviate; in other words, the leader can not
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3.3 Voting strategy 3, full reciprocal liability
Let us now consider full reciprocal liability, meaning that voters follow strategy 3 and reelect both incum-
bents if t3 +T3 ≤ τ3 and q3 ≥ q3, and reelect none if either of these conditions is not fulﬁlled. Thus, under
this strategy the incumbents are liable for each others’ expenditure decisions, as under strategy 2, and also
for each others’ tax decisions. The rents under this strategy are denoted x3 and X3, and t3, T3, y3, and
Y3 denote the levels of taxes and expenditures determined by the incumbents.
As under strategies 1 and 2, the follower can deviate from the proposed policy by setting t = r and
y = 0, which would give a payoﬀ of r = max{1 − T,1/2}. The follower will therefore seek reelection if and
only if
x3 ≡ τ3 − Ti
3 − y3(q3,Y i
3) ≥ r(1 − δ). (19)
where yi
3(q3,Y i
3) denotes the minimum value of y required to achieve q3 for Y = Y i
3.
Leaders seeking reelection had no choice under strategy 1, but under strategy 2 they chose Y I
2 to
maximize their rents. Under strategy 3, a leader seeking reelection chooses T3 and Y3 to maximize his rents,
X3 ≡ T3 − Y3, subject to the follower’s selection constraint, τ3 − T3 − y3(q3,Y3) − (1 − T3)(1 − δ) ≥ 0 and
the voting rule. The ﬁrst-order conditions become
T3 : 1 − λ3 [1 − (1 − δ)] = 0, (20)









Full reciprocal liability eliminates the leader’s possibility to deviate independently: if the leader chooses
a higher tax or lower expenditures than is in accordance with the follower’s selection constraint, it is in the
follower’s interests to maximize his immediate payoﬀ. Both incumbents will then obtain a payoﬀ of 1/2.
Therefore, it is suﬃcient that the voters guarantee the leader a rent of X3 = (1 − δ)/2. Rational voters
choose τ3 and q3 so that both incumbents seek reelection. Thus, the rents can be written
x3 = [1 − Y3 − (1 − δ)/2](1 − δ), (22)
X3 = (1 − δ)/2 (23)
and
XTot
3 = x3 + X3 = [1 − Y3 + δ/2](1 − δ). (24)
When writing the leader’s optimization problem and the expression for x3 above, I used that T3 must
be strictly below 1/2 since τ3 < 1. To understand why, note that in a situation where the leader chooses
between values of T3 above 1/2, x3 would equal (1−δ)/2 and the follower’s selection constraint would read
τ3 −T3 −y3(q3,Y3)−(1−δ)/2 ≥ 0. The ﬁrst-order condition for T3 would then become 1−λ3 = 0, which,
combined with equation (21), would give
∂y3v
∂Y3v = 1 and y3 = Y3. With x3 = X3 = (1 − δ)/2, this means
that t3 = T3, but this is impossible when T3 ≥ 1/2, given that τ3 < 1, which proves that T3 < 1/2.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 14
Looking at (23) and (22), we see that x3 > X3, since T3 = Y3 + (1 − δ)/2 < 1/2. Actually, X3 is less
than the rent the leader would obtain if the two incumbents acted as Nash competitors towards each other:
then the leader would obtain a rent equal to what he obtained under strategy 1, X1 = (1−y1 −x1)(1−δ),
which is above 1/2 since t1 = y1 + x1 < 1/2. Thus, under full reciprocal liability an incumbent is clearly
hurt by having to make its decisions before the other incumbent.
Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium under strategy 3 and compares it with the equilibriums under
strategies 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 Under strategy 3, (a) voters’ marginal cost of public expenditures of the leader is below unity,
while their cost for public expenditures of the follower is unity, (b) the output is produced ineﬃciently, and
(c) the voters are better oﬀ than under strategies 1 or 2.
To prove (a), note that voters’ marginal cost of public expenditures are one, plus the eﬀect that a
marginal increase in the expenditures has on the total political rent, described in (24). Therefore, we see
that the voters’ marginal cost is δ for Y , but that it is unity for y, since the leader’s payoﬀ from deviating
is ﬁxed at (1 − δ)/2 and hence unaﬀected by the follower’s tax and expenditure decisions.
Result (b) is proved by combining the leader’s ﬁrst-order conditions, (20) and (21). This gives δ =
∂q/∂Y3
∂q/∂y3,
which demonstrates that the leader chooses T3 and Y3 so that y3 > Y3. By choosing this ineﬃcient input
combination, the leader reduces the payoﬀ that the follower could obtain by deviating, and thus the rents
he must be given. Note that while the ineﬃcient input combination was chosen by the voters under strategy
2, it is chosen by the leader under strategy 3. This diﬀerence is because two policy variables are generally
insuﬃcient to enable voters to choose the input combination they prefer. However, that voters’ marginal
cost of public expenditures are δ for Y and unity for y implies that they, like the leader, prefer an input
combination described by δ =
∂q/∂Y3
∂q/∂y3. That the leader’s and the voters’ interests coincide in this matter is
because y and Y do not aﬀect the leader’s payoﬀ from deviating under full reciprocal liability. Thus, both
the leader’s and voters’ preferences concerning input combinations are results of the same wish to minimize
the sum of x3, y, and Y , for a given level of q3.
That the leader and voters prefer the same input combination for a given level of q3 means that the
voters are not restricted by the fact that, under strategy 3, they are unable to choose the ratio y/Y , by
choosing separate cutoﬀ levels for t and T (or for y and Y ). In other words, under full reciprocal liability,
it does not matter whether the voters decide on two, three or four cutoﬀ levels; the important thing is
that they reelect either none or both of the incumbents. The voters’ marginal costs of public expenditures
derived above is, however, arguably more interesting in with three or four cutoﬀ levels, since the input
combination is then a function of the voters’ marginal costs.
To prove (c), ﬁrst note that the leader is worse oﬀ under strategy 3 than under strategies 1 or 2, since
both X1 and X2 are above (1 − δ)/2 (as discussed in previous subsections), while X3 = (1 − δ)/2. In
addition, note that under all three voting strategies, the follower’s rent and the total political rent can be
written x = [1 − Y − X](1 − δ) and XTot = X + [1 − Y − X](1 − δ) = δX + [1 − Y ](1 − δ). Therefore, ifElectoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 15
X is reduced by one unit and Y is left unchanged, the total political rent is reduced by δ even though the
follower’s rent is increased by (1 − δ). This tells us that, for a ﬁxed level of Y , the total political rent is
lower under strategy 3 than under strategies 1 or 2. Since under all strategies voters can obtain the level of
Y that they prefer, voters are less strongly restricted and better oﬀ under strategy 3 than under the other
two strategies.
Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate that voters in an economic federation can strengthen their ability to
discipline the incumbents by introducing partial reciprocal liability, and even more so by introducing full
reciprocal liability. Still, total rents are higher than in the unitary country even under strategies 2 and 3.
This is proved by the fact that the t2, T2, and T3 are all below 1/2, which gives x2 > (1−δ)/2, X2 > (1−δ)/2
and thus XTot
2 > χ0, and x3 > (1 − δ)/2 and thus XTot
3 > χ0. An alternative assumption that would give
XTot
2 > χ0 is that yI
2 + Y I
2 + Y II
2 < δ. Since the total political rent is larger than in the unitary country,
voters are more strongly restricted and therefore worse oﬀ than voters in the unitary country. Corollary 1
describes what implications this has for the total tax rates.
Corollary 1 Under strategies 1, 2, and 3, the total tax rates are higher than in the unitary country.
Corollary 1 is proved by that the total rents under all strategies are higher than in the unitary country
and that public expenditures are reduced by less than one unit when the total political rent is increased by
one unit. That voters’ marginal costs of public expenditures are weakly lower with two government bodies
than with one means that the public expenditures will be larger here for a given level of total political rent.
This means that with two government bodies the public expenditures could actually be as large as, or even
larger than, those in the unitary country, despite more resources being diverted to political rent, and this
increases the diﬀerence between the total tax rate here and in the unitary country.
4 Intergovernmental transfers
In this section, I brieﬂy describe how voters are aﬀected if the leader is able to give an intergovernmental
transfer, s, to the follower. With the intergovernmental transfer, under all strategies, the leader will choose








subject the budget constraint
T − s − Y = X,
the voting rule, and the follower’s reactions. Voters will take into account possible eﬀects that the leader’s
new instrument has on the leader’s and follower’s decisions, when determining the cutoﬀ values.
Proposition 4 describes how voters are aﬀected if the leader is allowed to decide on an intergovernmental
transfer that is allowed to be negative, meaning that the leader could demand a transfer from the follower.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 16
Proposition 4 Under all strategies, voters are hurt if the leader is able to decide on a transfer that is
allowed to be negative.
Proposition 4 is explained by that if the leader can demand a transfer from the follower, the leader is
able to circumvent that he will access only half of the tax base directly if the total tax rate exceeds one. If
the leader can secure the transfer if he deviates, the leader could, under all strategies, guarantee himself a
payoﬀ of unity by setting T ≥ 1
2, s = −1
2, and Y = 0 and would therefore require a rent of 1 − δ not to do
so. The increases in the leader’s rent also imply increases in the total political rents under all strategies,
which in turn means that voters become more restricted and hence worse oﬀ.12
Proposition 5 describes how voters are aﬀected if the leader is allowed to decide on an intergovernmental
transfer that is restricted to be nonnegative.
Proposition 5 (a) Under strategies 1 and 3, voters are not aﬀected by whether the leader is able to decide
on a positive transfer to the follower, but (b) under strategy 2, the outcome is aﬀected negatively from the
voters’ perspective if yII
2 < Y II
2 when s = 0.
To see (a), ﬁrst note that under strategy 1, the leader has no incentive to transfer resources to the
follower, since the incumbents are evaluated separately by the voters. Thus, the leader’s opportunity to
decide on a positive transfer does not change the outcome under this strategy.
Under strategy 3, the leader is able to distribute the total tax revenues τ3 equally freely with and without
s. What matters to the leader is T − s, not the individual level of T or s. Thus, under strategy 3, s is a
superﬂuous instrument for the leader. This means that the levels of y, Y , x, and X will not be aﬀected by
the leader’s ability to transfer resources either under strategy 3, which proves (a).
To see (b), note that if the cutoﬀ levels are such that yII
2 < Y II
2 when s = 0, a deviating leader would
reduce Y II
2 and increase yII
2 by increasing s until yII
2 = Y II
2 . This would reduce the total expenditures
required to fulﬁll q2, because of the concavity of the production function, without increasing the rent the
follower requires, since the follower’s payoﬀ from deviating simultaneously with the leader is ﬁxed at 1/2.
This would increase the payoﬀ the leader could obtain by deviating and thus the rent he requires not to
deviate. This means that if the leader is able to transfer resources to the follower, the total political rent
for the cutoﬀ levels preferred by the voters without a transfer is increased, making the voters worse oﬀ.
Under strategy 2, voters would realize that with a transfer they cannot increase yII
2 + Y II
2 , for a given
q2, by altering the input combination. The voters’ only remaining reason to choose an ineﬃcient input
combination is then to contain the follower’s rent. In Appendix E, I demonstrate that, as under strategy
3, voters will therefore choose an input combination described by δ =
∂q/∂Y
∂q/∂y . Still, the solutions under
strategies 2 and 3 also diﬀer with intergovernmental transfers, since the leader’s rent is higher under strategy
2.
12The leader could get a rent of 1 − δ even without a negative transfer if the rules were changed so that he would get the
entire tax base if the total tax rate exceeds 1. Note that such a change would not imply that follower’s rent would vanish,
since the follower’s rent is based on the payoﬀ he can get by deviating, given that the leader has not deviated.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 17
The reason why voters can be hurt by allowing the leader to transfer resources to the follower under
strategy 2, but not under strategies 1 or 3, is that it is only under strategy 2 that both the leader and the
voters can aﬀect the leaders rent by altering the input combination: this can be done by the leader if s is
allowed and yII
2 < Y II
2 when s = 0, and otherwise by the voters.
To conclude, in the special cases where voters enforce no or full reciprocal liability, allowing the leader to
decide on a positive intergovernmental transfer will not hurt the voters, but with partial reciprocal liability,
this might increase the leader’s rent and the total political rent and thus make the voters worse oﬀ. Under
all strategies, allowing the leader to decide on a negative intergovernmental transfer will increase the leader’s
rent and the total political rent and thus leave the voters worse oﬀ.
5 Discussion
This paper addresses voters’ ability to discipline selﬁsh politicians. The focus is on a country with two levels
of government, where the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the incumbent at
the other and where voters are unable to evaluate the performance of the incumbents separately. Simple
retrospective voting strategies are considered.
As demonstrated previously by Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002), I found that, compared with
a situation with only one government body, more resources are diverted to political rents and voters are
worse oﬀ when two government bodies can commit resources independently. Since public expenditures are
reduced by less than one unit when the total political rent is increased by one unit, the higher political
rent also means that the total tax rate is higher in two-tier-government countries than in unitary countries.
The results of this paper also demonstrate that voters in two-tier-government countries have incentives to
increase the beneﬁcial public expenditures they require for reelecting incumbents, since this reduces the
resources diverted to political rents. This incentive increases the diﬀerences between the total tax rates in
two-tier-government countries and the tax rate in a unitary country.
As in Wrede (2002), the present results demonstrate that voters can strengthen their power by intro-
ducing reciprocal liability; that is, also holding politicians accountable for the decisions of politicians at the
other level of government. In fact, the present results provide stronger arguments for reciprocal liability than
do those of Wrede. Unlike the situation described by Wrede, where incumbents act as Nash competitors
towards each other, when one incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader, permanent Leviathan policy is not a
potential equilibrium even under full reciprocal liability. This diﬀerence between a Nash and a Stackelberg
game is easily understood: given that cutoﬀ levels are set appropriately, the Stackelberg leader can induce
the other incumbent not to deviate from the proposed policy and, knowing this, will have an incentive
not to deviate himself. In addition, unlike in a Nash game, in a Stackelberg game it is unnecessary that
incumbents determine taxes and expenditures more than once in each term to obtain positive eﬀects of a
reciprocal-liability strategy: in a Nash game two decision occasions per term are needed for an incumbent
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react to the leader’s decision even though both incumbents only make tax and expenditure decisions once
each term.
The results demonstrate that, with reciprocal liability, the voters’ marginal cost of beneﬁcial expenditures
of the Stackelberg leader is lower than their marginal cost of beneﬁcial expenditures of the follower. The
reason is that when more resources are “tied up” by the Stackelberg leader, the follower requires lower rent
not to deviate and take all the remaining resources. In addition, the results show that it is never in voters’
interests to allow the Stackelberg leader to transfer resources to the follower. Without reciprocal liability,
or with full reciprocal liability, the outcome will not be aﬀected by the transfer as long as it is restricted
to be weakly positive, but in the intermediate case with partial reciprocal liability, the outcome may be
aﬀected, making the voters worse oﬀ.
A policy implication of the results presented in this paper is that voters should strive for a situation
where one level of government acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to another. Emerging democracies, or
others forming new constitutions, can perhaps do this by requiring government bodies to decide on their
budgets at diﬀerent times. The results also imply that voters rather should expand the obligations for
governments that act as Stackelberg leaders, than for governments acting as followers.
When voters are unable to evaluate the performance of the incumbents separately, some degree of
reciprocal liability is unavoidable. One might argue that this can be seen as a positive eﬀect of lack of
transparency, since some voters likely do not realize the beneﬁts of reciprocal liability. However, reciprocal
liability and lack of transparency have serious downsides not captured by this model. Topics for further
research therefore include analyzing these issues when voters and politicians have heterogeneous prefer-
ences and when politicians diﬀer in competence. Another topic is to analyze how incumbents can increase
reelection probabilities by targeting expenses towards voters in key electoral constituencies.
Appendix
A. Relationships between c, y, and Y in the unitary country
To facilitate later comparisons, I solve the voters’ optimization problem as if they directly choose y and
Y . This can be done, since the incumbent in the unitary state, like the voters, prefers cost-minimizing
production. The voters can therefore achieve their preferred levels of y and Y by choosing τ0 and q0. The
voters’ optimization problem can be expressed as
Max
y,Y
V = u(1 − y − Y − (1 − δ)) + ϕ(q(y,Y ))
and the ﬁrst-order conditions become
y : −u￿ + ϕ￿∂q
∂y
= 0,
Y : −u￿ + ϕ￿ ∂q
∂Y
= 0.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 19
These conditions indicate that voters will choose the cutoﬀ levels so that the marginal utility of private
consumption equals the marginal utility of each input.
In a unitary country, the only diﬀerence between the benevolent politicians’ optimization problem and
the voters’ optimization problem with selﬁsh politicians just described is that no resources are diverted to
rents with benevolent politicians, meaning that the budget constraint becomes c = 1 − y − Y instead of
c = 1 − y − Y − (1 − δ).
B. Suﬃcient condition for Y II
2 > 0
In subsection 3.2, it is demonstrated that yI
2 < Y I
2 for Y II
2 > 0. If Y II
2 were zero and if voters were unable to
make Y II
2 positive by marginal adjustments in the cutoﬀ levels, yI
2 would still be less than Y I
2 (see Appendix
E). This implies that if Y II






∂Y when y > Y ) and that Y II
2 > 0 if yII
2 ≤ 2yI
2









t2 − (1 − δ)/2
t2 − x2
> 2.
Clearly, this condition is more likely to be fulﬁlled the larger x2 is, but note that even if x2 would equal
(1 − δ), the condition will only be fulﬁlled if x2
t2 > 2
3, since t2 − x2/2 > 2t2 − 2x2 only if 3
2x2 > t2.
C. Proof of Proposition 2 (a) and (b)
To obtain expressions for voters’ marginal costs for public expenditures, it is helpful to analyze the voters’
optimal choice of cutoﬀ levels t2, T2, and q2. This could be done by maximizing the voters’ utility with
respect to these cutoﬀ levels, but since the leader will choose Y I
2 so that the follower seeks reelection, the
terms associated with the follower’s budget constraint cancels out when the voters’ optimization problem is
solved in this manner. Therefore, it is more informative to solve the problem as if the voters directly chose
yI
2 and Y I
2 .13 This can be done since any combination of t2, T2, and q2 corresponds to a unique combination
of yI
2 and Y I
2 : the voters can, for example, increase y and reduce Y by increasing t and reducing T, and
they can increase yI
2 and Y I
2 simultaneously by increasing t2, T2 and q2.
Using that 1 − yI
2 − Y I
2 − XTot





V = u(1 − yI
2 − Y I
2 − XTot







1 − Y I
2 + δ














(1 − δ). (25)
13This approach is inspired by the literature on optimal non-linear taxation (see, e.g., Stiglitz 1982).Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 20




















































































(1 − δ). (29)
Using (12) and that t2 = yI
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

































































2 describe voters’ marginal cost of public expenditures of the follower and












2 in (28) and (29), which









> 0 and since Y II
2 — the minimum value of Y suﬃcient to achieve q2, given the
maximum value of y that the follower is prepared to accept without deviating when the leader deviates — is


























2 +(1−δ)/2 = t2,
∂yII
2
∂t2 = 1. This means that Y II
2 can be reduced when t2 is increased, but the
reduction in Y II
2 will be smaller than the increases in t2 and yII
2 if Y II
2 < yII
2 , which is the case unless Y I
2
is too large relative to yI
2, since Y II
2 < Y I
2 while yII
2 > yI



























< 1 for all values, which guarantees that
the denominators of (32) and (31) are both positive. Since Y I











2 < 1, meaning
that the numerator of (32) is negative and we therefore conclude that dt2
dY I
2
< 0. The reason for this is that
the follower’s rent is reduced when Y I
2 is increased (even though it is aﬀected positively by the reduction












> 0, the nominator of
(31) is positive, which means that dt2
dyI
2 > 0: when yI
2 is increased, t2 must be increased, not only to coverElectoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 21
the increased expenditures on y, but also to ﬁnance a slight increase in the follower’s rent (caused by a
reduction in the leader’s rent).





























> 0 if Y II
2 < yII
2 , and that dt2
dyI
2
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2 , using the short notation and that
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−A + (B − 1)
1 + A(1 − δ)2
1 + (1 − δ)2 (B − 1)
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−A + B − 1
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￿
δ(1 − δ). (33)







< 0 for all values of yII
2 and Y II
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(1 − δ). (34)
For yI





















































< 1, (35) is clearly negative. Thus, if yI
2 = Y I
2 , voters’ marginal cost would be higher
for y than for Y , and the voters will therefore choose an input combination where yI
2 < Y I
2 . Looking
at (34), we see that for yI
2 < Y I
2 but yII
2 > Y II
2 , the two products in the square bracket both become
positive. If yI











might be positive, but rational voters will


















2 < Y I
2 , voters will choose a solution where the marginal cost of y is higher than





< 0 for all values of yII
2 and Y II
2 , it
also proves result (a) of that proposition.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 22


























(1 − δ). (36)










∂t2 < 0, and that dt2
dY I
2












, is lower than
their marginal cost under strategy 1, 1 −
(1−δ)
2−δ .




















































A[(1 − δ)2 − 1] + B
￿
< 0. Using the deﬁnitions of A and











; for example, with a yearly discount
















(A − B + 1)[(1 − δ)2 − 1]
2 − δ
(1 − δ), (39)






< 0, this constitutes an
alternative proof of Proposition 2 (a).
E. Derivation of results regarding intergovernmental grants
With an intergovernmental transfer (called strategy 2i), yII
2i and Y II
2i are not functions of t2i if yII
2i < Y II
2i
when s2i = 0, since the leader can then oﬀset marginal changes in t2i by altering s2i. The voters’ ﬁrst-order

































Combining these conditions and rearranging shows that the solution is described by δ =
∂q/∂Y2i
∂q/∂y2i.Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government 23
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